

K said he had additional subject to discuss even though he disliked bringing up unpleasant matter on my last visit. He had read report first Rusk-Gromyko conversation and half of second but it was already clear our dialogue was coming to end. He would have no choice but to proceed with signature of treaty after which our rights there, including right of access, would end. He emphasized that East Germans were allies and Soviets would stand by them. On this occasion and others in conversation he showed great sensitivity to what he considered threats and said Soviet Union great power, not small country which could be threatened with impunity. Pres had suggested time would make solution easier but he could not wait indefinitely. From some things Sec Rusk had said we apparently had idea of unending talks, but this not acceptable. Sov govt had tried many different proposals to find solution but we insisted on maintaining occupation in center of sovereign GDR.

...xxmx Thomp: It was Soviet side and not we that had focussed world attention on Berlin to point where smallest thing became test of our intentions. I pointed out that psychology of people of Berlin and West Germany had become very important. Many people on our side felt that acceptance of Soviet proposals meant we would lose not only Berlin but rest of Germany and consequently all of Europe. I said that they and we knew what Ulbricht wanted in West Berlin. K had himself said that our troops in Berlin had no military value and we agreed with this appraisal, but they were essential to maintain confidence of people of Berlin.

K said we often referred to prestige but did not take into account prestige of Soviet Union. Continuance of occupation would be humiliating to East Germany and Soviet Union. He said we also referred to our commitment to people of Berlin but we had no right to make such commitment when it involved interests of allies who had made enormous sacrifices in war. I said I thought in matters of this kind it was important to try to get other persons point of view. I asked him what he would do if he had Soviet troops in similar situation and we said we would cut them off. I knew he would respond that he would sign treaty and withdraw (before interpreter reached this sentence K interjected to say exactly that). I got impression that this remark had some effect. K said he was considering bringing matter before UN and in this connection made some vague reference to possible commission of jurists--in order that SU could make clear its position before signing treaty. He said he was discussing this possibility with his colleagues but no decision had been taken and he had not made up his own mind whether this was best course but it had certain appeal for him.

This part of conversation ended by my telling him he should find way to give us better choice of alternatives than those now before us and...He was cordial throughout discussion and I had impression he considered he had to move ahead but was deeply troubled. He emphasized many times that this was the one problem standing in way of good relations between us and I believe he is sincere in this.



SU Foreign Office transcript of Berlin-UN remark:

USA and its allies are even threatening war in connection with our intention to conclude a German peace treaty and settle the West Berlin question on that basis. In view of this the thought has occurred to us in some way or other to interest the UNO in removing such a threat on the part of the Western Powers, if it were to arise in connection with the signing by us of a German peace treaty.

Thomp: I believe above represents considerably modified version of what actually was said.

((So this was proposal K was going to bring to UN--after elections--and after missiles operational!))

K asked me to speak to Pres about our harassment of Soviet ships. He cited both air inspection and one case where American ship had commanded Soviet ship stop or be fired on. He said these virtually act of war and if continued Soviets would have to reply in kind, but wished avoid warlike actions.

I have taken up this problem several times before and can only repeat my strong conviction that whatever value we may gain from our identification of Soviet ships in this way, we are paying too high a price for it in effect it has upon top Soviet leadership. This was almost only time in our long conversation when K spoke with any heat. He said SU was great power and could not tolerate being treated in this way. He said he doubted Pres knew about this personally and had considered writing him letter about it.

....

Reflecting upon my talk with K have following conclusions:

1) Am more convinced than ever that he at least does not intend push Berlin question to point of real risk of war. Much will depend, however, on attitude his colleagues and allies as well as upon how we handle the matter.... suggest we must be extremely careful on the one hand to show we are serious in our determination to defend Berlin and on other to avoid engaging their prestige particularly in the military field as they are unbelievably sensitive about this. I think, for example, we should for the present play down any boasts about our military superiority and in Berlin itself avoid any action that could be considered by them as annoyance on our part. At same time we should proceed vigorously with contingency planning which they will know about but without publicity.

I believe K is likely to bring Berlin problem ~~to~~ before UN and probably will personally present Soviet case.

...I doubt that we will get anywhere on real disarmament at this time. I got impression, however, that K will be prepared seriously to consider steps to prevent war by accident or miscalculation. If we can get over the Berlin hump and then let him know our intelligence capabilities we might make progress on GCD.



Thomp: The mere fact that K asserted he could achieve his seven year plan without disarmament convinces me that the opposite is the case...

K told me SU had suffered from drought in some areas but and excess rain in others but that crop would be about best they had ever had. In my opinion this almost certainly untrue and knowing K believe if this were fact he would have emphasized it much more strongly.



After phoning me for several days, had a half-hour interview with Dob. He said after our informal conversation of Aug. 23 he had informed the Premier, who had immediately asked him (somewhat to Dob's surprise, I gather) to pass on the following message, on which he urged me to take notes).  
memory

Sept 6: Dobrynin-Sorenson

The Soviet Government will take no action prior to the November elections to complicate the international situation or to raise the level of tension between our governments. We undertake not to do this so long as no action on the other side changes the situation.

2. The Premier definitely will not come to the UN for the opening of the General Assembly. If he should decide to come at all, it would not be till late November (after the elections). He does not want to interfere in your internal affairs.

This includes Berlin and the German question.

I appreciated this message, but must report the President's feeling that recent actions by the Soviets had already done a great deal to complicate the situation. Congress and the public were much more sensitive to Cuba. In view of ~~xxxx~~ Soviet actions there, this assurance seemed both hollow and tardy. (At this point Dob. interjected that he had tried to reach me with this message a week ago, before the Cuban issue heated up). The President had understood that the Premier did not desire to furnish weapons to our political opponents--therefore he takes the Soviet actions in Cuba as something of a deliberate and personal affront. The President was also very irritated by the Tass comment on our U-2 note, which he had taken pains to make moderate, temperate, and conciliatory (?). Dob claimed not to have seen the Tass comment, but you know how newspapers are, it was necessary to wait for the official comment.

He said he appreciated my comments on Cuba and would pass them on immediately. However, the arms being sent there were purely for defensive purposes. What the Soviet Union was doing there was nothing radical or new; the process at issue had been going on gradually and quietly for some time. To my mention of electronic equipment, technicians and missiles ((SAMS?)) he made no comment.



6 Sept.

In response to repeated phone calls, had half-hour conversation with D. He said he had sent report on our informal conversation of 23 Aug to K and, somewhat to his surprise, had received message from to be transmitted to me. (D read this slowly and urged me to take notes).

1. K would undertake nothing on international scene that would embarrass USG prior to elections, provided ~~xxxx~~ US behaved likewise.

2. K would not come to UN for opening; if he came, it would be after elections. He did not desire to interfere with internal politics.

((under 1; this specifically applied to Berlin.))

I replied that ~~ix~~ SU actions in Cuba had already caused Admin great trouble; in view of recent events, K assurance was both hollow and tarry. D demurred that he had tried to reach me with message a week ago. ((i.e., prior to discovery of SAMs, Pres. statement of Sept 4; was this hint that SU would not announce SAMs if US did not--encouragement to Pres to refrain from announcing? Or was D approach motivated by, or ~~xxxx~~ made even more urgent by, Pres statement of Sept 4?)) ((Meanwhile, SU was protesting U-2 strongly; was this a hint that U-2s should be stopped: a) incident would cause "trouble," would be due to US action, would release K from bargain; b) presence of SAMs made incident possible; c) there was nothing more for U-2s to find; d) if ~~xx~~2 there were anything more there to find, K wouldn't announce it or use it politically prior to election; e) therefore, just as well not to find it prior to election (assuming Pres would not want to act strongly, or have matter public, prior to election); f) by not calling public attention to U-2s--despite hints in Pres statement of ~~xxxx~~ 4 Sept--K would not make it difficult to suspend flights temporarily.)) ((Did D know of missiles? U-2? Seems simply messenger here--and he did not bring up Cuba)) I pointed out ~~xxxx~~ extreme sensitivity to this particular issue ((i.e., more than Berlin) by Congress and public. Pres had understood that K did not wish to give aid to political opponents of Admin ((Aug 23 talk?)). Therefore he took these recent events as a deliberate and personal affront. ((Compare to Ike on Suez.))

I also described his indignation at the nasty tone of the Izvestia comment on the U-2 note, which he had taken pains to make moderate in tone. D said he was not familiar with this comment, that there had been no official reply yet, that you knew how newspapers were.

D said he would report attitudes on Cuba carefully. He repeated several times that nothing new was going on in Cuba, that events there had been proceeding gradually and quietly for some time, that arms there were purely for defensive purposes. I cited Pres distinction between offensive and defensive weapons, and he said weapons were defensive. He made no comment, confirming or otherwise, on my mention of Soviet ~~xxxxxx~~ technicians, electronic gear or missile preparations ((Sou. read this as meaning strategic missiles; I take it as SAMs)).

((Same day, Sept 6, D described weapons as defensive to Stev))

((Guess: K message, parts 1 and 2, meant: I won't cause political trouble for you, by revealing anything embarrassing, if you don't. He couldn't mean: I won't do anything secretly--i.e., without immediate political consequences for you: since, as S points out, he had already done so, as Pres had revealed.



Friday, Oct 26, 1962, 3:36 pm

phone, Stev--Sec

S finds rumors of invasion and that has upset everything and the Afro-Asians are alarmed. Apparently, White made some statements about further measures. S. Thinks it would be a good idea to clamp down any of that talk from Dept. or WH. ...S thinks there is an outside possibility with prompt assurances of no attack by US or exiles that we might short-circuit the whole thing and get the dismantling and withdrawal in exchange for assurances re Cuba. It indicates the Dept must start thinking about guarantees it would give rex territorial sovereignty by OAS ~~xxxx~~others line they are taking is weapons are to deter attack by US and they, if they were sure US would not attack and had adequate commitments, would consider weapons unnecessary.

..If we can't short-circuit, there is the question of what constitutes the meaning of non-operable, etc. S hopes someone can look at this.

((meanwhile, letter had been sent; F-S meeting.))



Oct 20: Nitze. Possible action by Soviets in event that blockade imposed, Soviets continue construction and we then strike.

The psychological climate after the President's speech, the relatively restrained US approach and such political proposals as we may have made in the UN should be quite different in the event of a delayed strike, following onevidence of continued construction, from that to be expected from an initial surprise attack.

((only estimate I've seen of this sequence, and distinction on consequences.))

The delayed strike would face the Sovs with most serious decisions. They could not fail to take some form of counter-action without the most serious loss of face. The more forceful options open to them would, however, face them with most serious risks of a course which could be beyond their further control. They could not ignore the increased risks to them from an aroused world.

It can be argued that they would then show great caution, having clearly misjudged the initial play in the game. In that event they would confine themselves to propaganda, threats and negotiation.

On the other hand those urging more forceful actions might gain the upper hand in Sov decisions. The same options of forceful action would be open to them as in the event of an initial surprise attack. The political climate would, however, be substantially different.

(Implication is that climate would be more favorable to us. This supports "options" approach rather than immediate strike. It could be inferred directly from this--and from no other discussion I've seen--that Sovs, looking ahead one step, might back down if we could convince them of likelihood of strike following blockade, given unpromising situation they would then inhabit.))

(Nuclear blow from Cuba; US reply with invasion of Cuba, seriously consider compensatory strike against SU with notice of limited character). (Preemptive attack on SAC not intelligent--against alerted SAC. Blockade of Berlin; but effect of our action in Cuba would add great credibility to the Phase II measures contemplated by Berlin contingency planning. ((good))

Most serious danger is that they would strike our bases in Turkey or elsewhere with conventional weapons. We might have to eat these losses (why?) and go into negotiations re overseas bases. Our negotiating position would, however, be vastly stronger than if we had not acted against the Cuban installations.

((All in all, the most relevant--and validated--estimate.))



Stev. memo concerning Security Council presentation:

9. Whether or not the SC or GA may have acted on our resolution, no UN presence can be established in Cuba without Soviet consent, which will probably not be forthcoming before a Summit meeting. Hence we must assume that the base build-up may continue pending a broad political settlement reached at the Summit. A full political program (UN observers, territorial integrity of Cuba, and evacuation of foreign bases) proposed now might well attract so much general support that the Soviets would stop further build-up pending the Summit and make an air strike unnecessary.



S 80-62 KX 17 Jan 1962 The threat to US security interests in the Caribbean Area

(over the next two decades).

Cuba and any other Caribbean state which fell under Communist control could be used by the USSR as areas in which to establish missile, submarine, or air bases, designed to bring North America under attack or to add to the deterrents to any conceivable US military action in the Caribbean or elsewhere. On the whole, we believe the establishment of such Soviet bases is unlikely for some time to come. Their military and psychological value, in Soviet eyes, would probably not be great enough to override the risks involved.

The Soviet leaders would be concerned lest steps toward the establishment of such bases would provoke the US to overthrow the Castro regime before bases could become operational and would generally heighten the risk of war. Moreover, Soviet bases in Cuba could involve the USSR in difficult political and control problems with the Cuban government; the Soviets have been very careful to retain control over situations which involve them in any serious degree of risk, and they would be mindful of the danger that Cuban initiatives could expose the USSR to serious risks of general war.

((Note U-2 shutdown of 27 Oct!)) Finally, the Soviet leaders, for the present at least, appear to prefer not to make their presence too obvious or apparent, lest they discourage rather than encourage the spread of communism to other Latin American countries. Since their essential aim in Latin America is not military conquest but Communist revolution, we believe they will prefer to use Cuba as a symbol of spontaneous revolution and as a base for subversive operations.

((No mention of goals in Europe that might seem urgent, might be served by missiles--not just base--in Cuba.))

Nevertheless, the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. ((Fishing port!)) For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes.

This reluctance to establish military bases might not extend over the entire period under review. ((two decades)) If communism spread to other countries in the area, and if the US appeared to be weakening in world power and national will, the Soviet leaders might be emboldened to buttress their gains by openly establishing Soviet military bases in the area, with the object of further weakening US prestige and further strengthening and protecting their local satraps. If such bases were established, the first step might be the establishment of jointly-operated submarine or air bases, on the theory that the establishment of such bases would be less likely to incur risk of a US reaction than would the establishment of missile bases, while at the same time constituting a demonstration of Soviet presence and protection.



Sit and Prospects in Cuba 85-62 21 March 1962

It is notable that Bloc military deliveries to Cuba to date have been such as to enhance Cuba's capabilities for defense against external attack and for the maintenance of internal security rather than to contribute to the development of an independent offensive military capability. The Bloc has provided no strategic weapon systems. Although the Cuban army has been made formidable by Carib. standards, Cuba lacks the air and naval capabilities required for major overseas military operations, even at Carib. distances. The bomber force is still limited to a few inherited B-26's.

These Bloc military deliveries have been responsive to the most urgent requirements of the Castro regime, but they probably also reflect a deliberate Bloc policy. In keeping with its demonstrated concern to avoid any commitment to come to the defense of Cuba with its own forces, the USSR presumably desires to avoid the possible Sov involvement inherent in providing Cuba with independent means for taking major military action against its neighbors.

On these grounds, we believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with air, missile, or naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas, or that it will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. This attitude would not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units. It would also not preclude the provision of a token number of Il-28 jet light bombers. Special Sov comm and intell. facilities will probably be established in Cuba.

((So: from past behavior, Sov intentions and motives are deduced, and from these, future behavior predicted; the bet is against change in behavior. (But what precludes change in motives, goal?)

Note early origin of offensive-defensive distinction, precise lines drawn in Sept 13 statement (except for Il-28s); prediction of everything except: a) SU combat units, large personnel base; b) large number of Il-28s; c) MRBM-IRBMs.

(Had estimate changed at all as of 1 Aug? 19 Sept? Were any "surprises" noted at all by then?)

If the overthrow of the regime should be seriously threatened by either external or internal forces, the USSR would almost certainly not intervene directly with its own forces. However, interpreting even an internal threat as US intervention, the USSR would seek to deter the US by vigorous political action, including threats of retaliation on the periphery of the Bloc as well as ambiguous references to Soviet nuclear power. Nevertheless, the USSR would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba.

((Is there a hint of following methodology: 1) Deduce past SU goals from past action; 2) extrapolate future actions on assumption that goals are constant?))



Rostow for Pres, 3 Sept 62

On the basis of existing intelligence the Sov military deliveries to Cuba do not constitute a substantial threat to US security. They do constitute a deterrent to certain types of surveillance... They also constitute evidence that Moscow, having been frustrated in certain directions, is in a mood to double its bet rather than cut its losses, at least on a selective basis. In this case, Moscow has moved strongly but defensively to meet Castro's anxieties about overflights and other intrusions, and to shore up his flagrantly weak economy.

These deliveries constitute, further:

1. A psychological move of some power in the Caribbean and in the rest of Latin America...
2. A psychological move likely to heighten US domestic anxiety with respect to Cuba.
3. A testing thrust by Moscow, which, at considerable financial cost and further commitment of prestige, places before us the question of where and how we should draw the line with respect to unacceptable action and behavior by the Communists in Cuba and the Hemisphere.

We face, therefore, a problem of both formulating a reaction and articulating it in ways designed to: diminish the political costs under 1 and 2, above; minimize the likelihood of any further extension of Cuban capabilities or Soviet capabilities or Soviet capabilities in Cuba; and provide the legal and policy basis, under certain contingent circumstances, for the liquidation of communism in Cuba by force.

A. Drawing the line. The ambiguities in the public mind, here and abroad, about the military meaning of the Soviet deliveries require not merely that we explain what they are and why-- up to a point-- we are prepared to regard them as acceptable, but that we also clarify the kinds of installations and capabilities emplaced in Cuba which we would regard as unacceptable. The President must consider going beyond his statement of April 20, 1961: "I want ~~it~~ it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation!" These deliveries, rightly or wrongly, raise the question in the public mind of the security of the Nation; and it may, therefore, be appropriate to indicate what we would not be prepared to accept without direct military riposte. In general, that line should be drawn at the installation in Cuba or in Cuban waters of nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles, sea or land based. There may be other types of aggressive instruments that we would wish to include in this definition. In addition, this may be an appropriate occasion to underline our willingness to act with others in the Hemisphere against Cuba should Castro undertake direct or indirect aggression against other Latin American nations.



2.

The Comm position will, undoubtedly, be that we have established on the Eurasian land mass military installations proximate to their borders, including nuclear delivery capabilities. Our reply must be and can be that by regional security action, provided for under the Charter of the UN, this Hemisphere operates under a different set of rules than the Eurasian land mass. In this context, it should be noted that we would be playing directly into Moscow's hands to use the occasion of pressure on us in Cuba to withdraw THORS from Turkey. ((Who brought t is up?)) There is no clear stopping place for Communist activities based in Cuba unless we hold fast to the special status in Hemispheric law and agreement of "extra-continental" intervention.

...Our NATO allies must come to understand that we are not prepared to accept symmetry between the Allied position on the Eurasian land mass and the Communist presence in this Hemisphere; and that a condition for understanding with Washington is their recognition of the seriousness of this matter to us.

((Asked by Pres to review Cuba over the weekend, after having been out of it. Pres read; no feedback, however. Basis for Sept 4 statement?

Any planning on ~~xxxx~~ possible actions if they did put in nuclears? see NSAM 181. R mentions blockade, invasion, air strike; adds possibility of commando raid to destroy installations. discusses covert actions.

Was commitment mainly a chance to say ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ why we were accepting what was there, in the context of saying something bold (about what we would do in other circumstances), thus allaying criticism of our acceptance as being weakness; (note parallel to planning something bold, while accepting current opposing actions); did Moscow interpret it this way? Is this the way, in fact, commitments get made? (e.g., British commitment to Poland) Similar to acceptance of a fait accompli: we will act very bravely and swiftly, next time ("We are bold, despite current inaction: witness our bold staking of prestige and planning for action.")

(R's interpretation of Moscow's readiness to double its bets reflects his paper of a week earlier on K's incentives to gamble. His view was that a sense of weakness and failure was a motive to K to take a gamble with a high risk (R thinks K thought odds were no better than 50-50; I suspect, much better) of considerable prestige failure--though not of military loss, since he would withdraw. Hence, R not surprised when missiles appeared; and R's expectation was that he would withdraw them if confronted with a high risk of military action, without need for any concessions by us. R fought strongly against deal, on Wednesday--Saturday: representing J, Tyler, Owen, along with Nitze and Rusk, vs 10, McG, (Ball?), (JFK?). R not surprised when K withdrew on Sunday; doesn't know expectations just prior to that of ExComm.

R did know of Friday night letter Friday night (consider Saturday mornin meeting!). Was working on "surgical" air plan; (thinks McN countered JCS 1500-sortie proposal with proposal for 6). Thinks Pres would have hit



GWB recommendation to Pres

I am persuaded that the disadvantages of an air strike are too great for us to undertake it. I have, therefore, concluded that the blockade plan--while by no means wholly satisfactory--is the course we should follow.

...begun with assumption that the Sov nuc build-up in Cuba does not add appreciably to the Sov ability to impose destruction on the US...

If this assumption be valid--and I have heard no compelling arguments against it--then the menace we face is not the addition of new Sov military capabilities so much as their moral and propaganda advantage. As I understand it, the proponents of the strike plan insist that what we are facing is a test of will that will be witnessed by all the world. Unless the US is prepared to use decisive military power, the world will lose confidence in our strength and determination.

But I think that--far from establishing our moral strength--we would, in fact, alienate a great part of the civilized world by behaving in a manner wholly contrary to our traditions



drafts: 3

TCS first draft, 20 Oct

(Sept 11, Gromyko statements). The USA need not and cannot tolerate defiance, deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.

(final: Neither the US nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. ) (Suez?)

We no longer live in a world where only an actual "armed attack" as Article 51 of the UN Charter originally intended the phrase, represents a challenge to a nation's security.

(We no longer...where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril.)

Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantial increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in the nature of their threat, may well require an act of self-defense.

(...or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.)

.....  
Nevertheless American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines. In that sense, our danger has not been greatly increased. ((in pencil: ~~has~~ not been altered in kind but has been substantially increased.))

(final: In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger ((third draft, 21 Oct: simply add)) --although it should be noted that the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.)

blockade: And let me make it clear that it will not only prevent completion of the current offensive build-up. It will also require the Soviet Union to choose between fighting the American Navy in American waters, or abandoning its obligations to Mr. Castro. It will also have, in a comparatively short time, a profound effect on the military, economic and political underpinnings of the Castro regime; and it will be continued until all missiles and offensive bases are gone from that island.

(final: deleted. )



first draft: 2

I have directed our military forces...  
Secondly, (close surveillance); ; to take  
further military action if that build-up continues, threatens  
and so requires;

((final: should these offensive military preparations  
continue, thus increasing the threat to the Hemisphere,  
further action will be justified. I have directed the  
Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust  
that in the interests of both the Cuban people and the  
Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned  
of continuing this threat will be recognized.))

...to include these air and missile bases on the targeting system  
of our strategic and retaliatory forces; and finally, to  
regard any missile launched from Cuba as an attack by the SU  
requiring a massive retaliatory response upon the SU.

((final: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard  
any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation  
in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the SU upon  
the US, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the SU.))

(contrast McN backgrounder, Oct 22. Controversy, reasons,  
on this wording?)

...  
I am asking Soviet Chairman Khrushchev, who will shortly be  
coming to the UN meeting in New York, to meet with me at the  
earliest opportunity with respect to this provocative threat to  
world peace and the relations between our two countries.

((I call upon Chairman K to halt and eliminate this clan-  
destine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace  
and to stable relations between our two nations.))

...But we will not negotiate with a gun at our heads--a gun  
that imperils innocent Cubans as well as Americans. Our byword  
is: "Negotiation yes, intimidation no!" That is why this threat--  
or any other threat which is made independently or in response  
to our blockade--must and will be met with determination; and  
therefore, while any talks go on, our forces all over the world  
will be alert--and the blockade will remain.

(: But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these  
problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why...  
made independently or in response to our actions this week--  
(last part deleted).))

One path we shall never choose--the path of ~~xxxxxxx~~ surrender  
or submission. I tell you, therefore, that these missiles now  
in Cuba will someday go--and no others will take their place.

((last sentence deleted))



drafts: 3

Original deprecates ~~threat~~~~emphasizes~~ military significance, emphasizes "defiance," deception. Final stresses increased threat, provocative change, clandestine move, threat to Latin America.

First amounts to justifying preventive or preemptive attack.

Initial emphasizes blockade as answer; only provisionally mentions possibility of further military action; says missiles will go someday.

Final emphasizes possibility of further military if preparations continue; implies action this week; does not emphasize blockade as answer to buildup.

Initial suggests summit conf, negotiation as answer to continued buildup; final does not.

Initial merely quotes Sept 11 and Gromyko; third draft calls Sept 11 statement "patently false and misleading," calls Gromyko statements "dishonest and dishonorable. "

Final: calls both false.



22 Oct. Cover letter to K with speech. Refers to discussion at Vienna, Pres assertion there that US would not allow SU to take actions overturning present balance of power.

((Balance then conceived as "equal"? But now conceived as unequal, favoring US; we were, in effect, still proposing to prevent K from producing drastic change in balance of power, in direction of equality. Meanwhile, K had vigorously rejected this position at Vienna, refused to renounce efforts to change the balance of power in Russia's favor.))

Had given specific example there of possible miscalculation of US determination: trying to destroy US rights of access to Berlin.

Do not mistake moderation of current action for lack of determination; we are determined that missiles shall be removed. I hope you will act prudently, have snips comply with quarantine.

K reply, 23 Oct: cover letter with public reply. You have no right to take action. Weapons of Cuba, whatever their character, are for defensive purposes. Cuba is small, cannot be a threat to giant US.

Reply (?) 23 (?) Oct: You started this, by putting missiles in Cuba  
~~2xx@clxxsxxvxxxtxxquarantintxxnotxx~~

R reply to quarantine: put yourself in my position; ultimatum; cannot comply; ~~pxix~~ piratical; have ordered captains not to comply.

((But had ordered them to turn morning of 23 Oct, before OAS vote; they changed course about noon; Navy didn't report this to ExComm till 24 Oct; announced 25 Oct.))

reply, 25 (?) Oct: refers to Shipments in August, Pres statements. You made deceptive statements, in public and private, assuring that no offensive weapons were being sent. On the basis of this assurances, I ~~xx~~ publicly restrained those who wanted to take action. Then I learned that recently you had been installing missiles.

26 Oct letter at US Emb in Moscow at 1000, probably sent about 0930 Washington time; it didn't begin arriving till about 1800 (discussed at ExComm meeting at 2000).

F met with S about noon, Wash time; F called earlier (when?). Sou infers F offer sent earlier than letter, as it arrived; but times seem consistent with F offer being conceived at same time or later than letter, transmitted to F about same time or even after letter sent. Makes sense to me that F offer was a specification of vague "proposal" in letter ((which says only that if US would give guarantee...then situation would change, everything would differ; this would destroy need for technicians. Can't speak for C but he would no longer have need for mobilization. & I propose: you guarantee drop quarantine; we would (send no more arms?); then necessity for weapons you term offensive would disappear.)) Reply to & F might have signalled: ~~xx~~ couple of days before US action (?); and, highly likely that this offer would be accepted if others failed; ~~minxx~~



continued:

if this had failed, no use trying tougher one, in private let alone in public; 27 Oct letter--sent about 24 hours after 26 Oct letter, and after S reply to F (presumably, after receipt of F report in Moscow) may have been public probe, public in part because hope of generating public support for it (also, to speed delivery?)

((Sie: Rusk maintains emphatically that 27 Oct letter was a result of public suggestions by Lippman on 25 Oct and Kreisky (Lippman not available for reflection in Moscow in time for 26 Oct letter?))

(Note: US couldn't charge "bad faith" because even if they had been public, neither 26 Oct letter nor ~~2 F~~ "question" could be described as a commitment to a definite offer. E.g., 26 Oct letter doesn't mention Turkey, but doesn't say that missiles would be removed, either. The "necessity" for them would disappear (not necessarily missiles)--~~xxxxxx~~ SU had denied necessity for them even before crisis, but had put them in anyway--but that could mean, they are then available for bargaining, e.g., against those equally "unnecessary" missiles in Turkey. The F offer, in contrast, was a specific trade, in which Turkey did not figure: but was purely hypothetical.

Acceptance of F offer did not bind K at all (or US); but it revealed acceptability of this to US, thus gave him strong basis for believing he could get at least this; in absence of this, he might not have felt free to spend time probing, in view of other signals.

Sou, Sie: tendency of ExComm officials to deprecate F-8 exchange in view of 26 Oct letter; but would that not have appeared quite ambiguous if the F offer were not available to make if specific? Note that our reply of 27 Oct is essentially to F offer, not to 26 Oct letter.

By sending F offer, K in effect got an immediate reply to his 26 Oct letter, read in a form favorable to US; in effect, he had US public reply of 27 Oct on the night of 26 Oct or early morning of 27 Oct: probably before sending 27 Oct letter. ((whereas public impression--and of how many members of ExComm, staff?)), he didn't get reply to either before he had sent both.

Big US decision of afternoon of 27 Oct was not to combine two letters but to ignore 27 Oct letter; meanwhile, threatening (as retaliation to Anderson, or to further shootdowns? Or, just as "retal" to failure to remove missiles? What was threatened, or ~~rapid~~ implied? If Anderson stressed, this suggests action against SAMs; if missiles, missiles. What was feeling of ExComm about Anderson, and about implications of prior commitments about U-2s and political consequences of inaction. Was K "forcing our hand"? (See Sie account of Ball reaction)).

((



14 May

Did K have reason to imagine that JFK might hold information tight till after election, or longer?

Sonn: crate evidence was available (to?) prior to Sept 19 estimate but was not distributed to estimators; Air Force analysts were convinced it was 11-28's. Item got in Bull one day toward end of September, but was withdrawn and order went out there were to be no further items included and no further speculations published on subject. Not mentioned publicly till Oct 22. He believed at time Admin. meant to withhold it till after election. K may have believed we knew it, drew same inference.

(Note: Bowles-Dobrynin conversation later, Oct 13; how did Bowles interpret this? What was plan? Why did we not confront, ask? Was there a "crisis" at news?)

Moreover, Sonn believed and believes that K thought we knew by Sept 13 at least--planes were flying, scratches were to be seen (by Sept 5? was that flight over right area--no--or did K know exactly what it might have seen? Or might he have thought we would have agent reports?) and took Sept 13 statement as evidence that JFK did not mean to announce or react.

But how could JFK fail--and how could K think he would fail--to release news or react, after statements of 4 and 13 Sept?

Sonn did believe, and belief was general, in week of discovery, that K intended to announce missiles in connection with Berlin, when they were ready, maybe the day after the election; K's statements connecting Berlin with after election did sink home, Thompson thesis that missiles were connected with Berlin was accepted, hence timing; moreover, pace suggested this. (It was not immediately clear when they would be operational. Also, it was not clear that any were operational then; it seemed likely that K would regard deterrence as better, against invasion or attack, when all were operational, and "one might go off.")

Sonn doesn't think ExComm did consider withholding news (note how many ~~new~~ knew by Oct 15; did this many, outside of int analysts, know of 11-28's?). But they were concerned about one possibly going off, perhaps captured or controlled by Cubans! Couldn't sit still with that possibility!

McN said (Sonn, Hil) from Tuesday to Thursday: in purely military strategic terms, no problem, just extra targets, makes no difference; no crisis (this was interpreted by L&R as arguing for inaction; but was this McN's recommendation, or was he merely abstracting from political considerations to give comment on wartime implications?)

Weiss: in my thesis, don't emphasize election so much in Cuban case as factor that K thought would make JFK so reluctant to announce to public; election may have been tactical consideration, adding insurance, but W. thinks main consideration would have been record of previous two years, leading K to think that JFK would accept move; hence, K would have been about as willing to do it in spring, or after election. (?) Berlin 1961 would be exception in pattern (though, Berlin Wall). ((But, maybe that taught K that the overt challenge was mistake, would force JFK's hand; what would get him to "cooperate" would be fait accompli, in public's eyes; public must not have proof too early, JFK must not be forced to give proof too early and JFK public must not have proof later that JFK knew earlier. (photos



14 May

Hils: F-S exchange essential to interpretation of 26 May letter. The two were probably sent as a package ((K might guess: more likely to get answer to F offer earlier; and more likely to get good answer to letter if read in light of F offer.))

F was resident. (sure?)

Rusk told S to call F Saturday afternoon, wrote out message. S saw F at 1630, berated him in violent terms for Saturday morning message negating Friday night offer; said we never, never would consider Turkey deal in the slightest; said letter "means war." Said he spoke for himself, but hinted he reflected mood of higherups.

(F claimed at start, and later, that K had not had F message at time he wrote Saturday morning letter.)

S had dinner with F Sunday night; F said he had been instructed to tell S that his services were much appreciated, and had been very valuable. In particular, that applied to his "explosion" Saturday afternoon.

Hils feels: Rusk took S channel very seriously at time, spent much time and attention with it; definitely influenced interpretation, and was basis for Trollope ploy. (Says Excomm was jubilant at 1000 Saturday morning, till new letter came in). F offer was only offer of inspection ((till Saturday morning letter?)), and F-S exchange Saturday afternoon the only brutal, explosive exchange known to Hils to convey mood to K.

Hughes checked out Keating claim of Oct 10, at the time, that there six IRBM sites; int comm had no basis for this; no refugee reports mentioned six, or total number; there were two good reports about Oct 18--could have been around earlier--but they referred to storage sites at Remedios. Hils thinks Keating got this out of the air.

(But consider position it put administration in, with their flat statements on "I know there is no evidence on missiles...I think it extremely unlikely they would put missiles in.")



3. Baraz' paper of 12-19 Oct exemplified earlier Hilsman thesis that intell. should ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ consider consequences of U.S. actions; but also, role that this puts I&R into of imagining and quasi-evaluating U.S. policies. While still regarding their missiles as unlikely, he was asking: "But suppose they did put them in, What might we do, and what would the likely responses be to these actions, by SU, Cubans, allies, neutrals? "

(( "How could the Sovs have achieved a fait accompli? How could they have prevented a US crisis--by convincing us that 'There was nothing to be done,' too late, no challenge to action, no opportunity to avert undesired change in the status quo. How could they have delayed our discovery; stayed our hand; increased risks to us of action, reduced incentives?

"How could they have triggered a US ~~x~~ direct attack on missiles? Did they know what it took? Might they have done it? "

Baraz:

If Sovs had earlier put MRBMs into a satellite: that would have made it look less unlikely that he would put them into Cuba; yet, it would still look like a "first" for him, a switch: It would still be outside the Warsaw Pact, a country without an alliance, not really, yet, fully within the Bloc, at such a long distance, with an unreliable leader.

(( Were the peculiar advantages of putting missiles into Cuba, as opposed to other locations, taken fully into account? The various incentives so clear now to Southard? And how reliable were these former patterns held to be; how reliable, on past experience, was the very notion that "K doesn't break from his patterns"? ))

One aspect of Hilsman--I&R line on including Castro in threats was: K's reaction when confronted with an indirect challenge was much more predictable; his reaction if confronted with a direct ultimatum much less so.



Sonnenfeldt, Bob Baraz, 16 April.

Sonn. told morning of 16th by Hilsman.

On Scali: Sonn had gone home Friday evening: was called back by Hilsman about 9:15, told about Scali and about K letter. Spent all night working on paper analyzing the two developments, comparing them, to be presented by Hilsman to ExComm the next morning. ((Was Sorenson working on reply that night? Did ExComm have a draft to consider when it met at 10?))

Scali ~~xxx~~ came to Hilsman; they were with Rusk, about 6, when K letter began to come in; it came last section first (the "business end") and came in to them all, discussed in front of Scali. It seemed to confirm Scali story, which was more precise: called for UN supervision and inspection, offered to withdraw. Scali sworn in, "cleared," discussed answer.

Thus, while letter alone might have been more ambiguous, Fomin offer had considerable impact on its interpretation. In considering a draft reply, they were in effect taking the details from the Fomin offer. Later, when Saturday letter came in, the final reply could be interpreted as taking the details--the specific offer to withdraw and the terms of inspection--from the Fomin offer (or the Saturday letter), rather than from the Friday night letter (which didn't have them), while ignoring the Turkey deal.

((Sonn admits they may overemphasize the Fomin-Scali episode, because of being in on it and close to it. Sieverts says other members tend to deprecate it, say it was the word from K himself that was regarded as important (but couldn't Fomin have influenced interpretation of that?) and "We didn't have any need ~~xx~~ for informal contacts, outsiders; we had plenty of contact, e.g., Tommy" (but might not Sovs have preferred approach through Scali, to whom they had no responsibilities, could disown?) (Note that Tommy prefers to believe that Dobrynin didn't know the story--which is probably true, but also convenient, allowing Tommy to continue his relationship with him).))

ExComm was undoubtedly very relieved Friday night, early Saturday morning; thought it was over. (Could they really relinquish this mood, of having won "peacefully" through threats rather than attack, by Saturday or Sunday--give up hope of settlement and turn to choice of attack?)

Rostow probably didn't know Saturday morning of Friday night letter (or Scali); Tyler and his deputy didn't.

((Rostow operation generally a backwater; Sonn: It would have made more sense to have that operation after the crisis--rather than tie up as many good people as it did. Consider analogy to the crisis operations at RAND. Did they have any impact, on anyone? Did they have enough information, were they enough in touch?))

Next day, Scali gave Fomin hell about Turkey letter: what's going on, you never said anything about Turkey. Fomin seemed embarrassed.

There were further Scali-Fomin contacts.



## 2. Sonnenfeldt

Night of 21-22 Sept, Hilsman tried to persuade Mike Forrestal to include Castro in denunciation in speech. Sonn wrote memo about 2-3 in the morning. But "speech was already written."

Sieverts: this was Hilsman's hobby horse. He had pushed, then and later, on notions that: a) this would broaden options, lay groundwork for later actions to get rid of Castro (which I&R thought should be pushed); b) this would give Khrushchev an opportunity to shove blame onto Castro and abandon him, along with missiles.

Sonn: as it worked out, it was a greater defeat for Khrushchev, so probably just as well. Baraz: probably wouldn't have made much difference.

((But why was notion dropped of including Castro, or even of focussing on him? Sieverts: Intelligence was determining--it indicated more and more clearly that this was purely a Russian undertaking, operation. But that didn't mean a) Castro hadn't invited it; b) we shouldn't seize opportunity to blame Castro. Who/why/when was opposition to this?))

(note: Carter was acting DCI while McC away)

General belief in intell. commun that SU wouldn't put missiles; SNIE except for McC in CIA ((when did he start? prior to SAMs?)) and a group with Nigro (?) in DIA; because it was so uncharacteristic.

Baraz: combination of feelings that it was "too different" and "too risky" for Sovs; he knew of no individual who held one view without the other (e.g., "it's not the sort of stupid, reckless thing they usually do").

(Did this reflect feeling that (a) if US did take local action beyond blockade, SU would be in bad spot? and (b) they would have to give some attention to that? But maybe (Southard, Munson) they gave very little prob to that; or (Sonn) they regarded that as possible but "less likely," and as ~~xxxx~~ with some other bureaucracies, contingency of less likelihood got virtually no attention.))

Various reasons for not expecting: for surprise:

- 1) "It's too different."
- 2) "It's too dangerous."
- 3) "It's too mean." (Thompson; JFK? Rusk? Growing hopes of understanding; "dialog" with Gromyko in New York on non-dissemination, Berlin, test ban; hopeful. ((So, pressures for action may have been seen as jeopardizing that dialog; as would a U-2 incident?))

Note feeling on 28 Oct, virtually unanimous in State and WH: there must be no gloating, don't rub it in, hurt K's position; and (b) now that K has looked close at nuclear war, there is a chance for real progress: he will never try such a thing again. The belief that he has learned make it unnecessary for us to learn, i.e., to modify the expectations that made his act a surprise for us.



December 29, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

The Ambassador from Turkey presented an interpretation of Khrushchev's behavior in the Cuban crisis that might interest you; namely, that Khrushchev didn't know the difference in U.S. behavior between a Presidential and a Congressional election year.

He observed Khrushchev closely in New York in the fall of 1960 when he represented Turkey at the U.N. General Assembly. He noted then the impact on Khrushchev of seeing the U.S. rudderless during the election campaign, without even Lodge in attendance. He recalled that Jerry Wadsworth was moved into the breach. Khrushchev disported himself freely in that atmosphere. He is convinced that Khrushchev thought the same disarray would prevail during the election campaign of 1962.

We can leave it to the historians to check it out.

May I add a word. I remember with admiration the depth of your concern for the Cubans on the beach at the worst of the April 1961 affair, the night of the Congressional reception, when there was occasion for many other things to be on your mind. And I know that personal concern never left you. Their return now is thus doubly gratifying.

A Happy New Year.

Faithfully yours,

*/s/ W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

The President

Washington, D. C.



New York Times Mag, Nov. 18, 1962

Mr. K said that even though he had had many difficulties with General Eisenhower, he was certain that, if Eisenhower were President at this time, the problem of Cuba would have been handled in a much more mature manner. He stated he would hate to believe that President Kennedy's decision was due to the fact that we were having elections in the near future in the US. In any event, he observed Pres. Kennedy had embarked on a very, very dangerous policy, whether because of American histrionics or the President's youth.



April 26, 1963

# 1962 Cuba Quarantine Criticized and Defended at Law Parley

By ANTHONY LEWIS  
Special to the New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25 -- Last fall's quarantine of Cuba was praised and denounced today at a meeting of the American Society of International Law.

Prof. Quincy Wright of Columbia University was the principal critic. He said President Kennedy's move to force removal of Soviet missiles had been "an illegal and dangerous unilateral action."

"By the quarantine," Professor Wright said, "the United States resorted to forcible action that cannot be justified with our obligations under the United Nations Charter. You cannot reconcile the position we took with the obligation to settle all disputes by peaceful means."

Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, said the quarantine was not a "legal issue" at all in the way that phrase should be understood.

## Issue Held 'Above Law'

"In our system," he said, "the survival of states is above law--it must be."

Mr. Acheson suggested that no lawyer could really have said, in October, whether the quarantine was "legal" or "illegal." The law, he said, simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power--power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty.

As a historical example he mentioned the refusal of the Court of King's Bench in the 14th Century to pass on the validity of the Duke of York's claim to the English Crown. The question was too much one of power, not of principle.

"It is harmful to believe," Mr. Acheson said, "that nations have accepted restraints on their sovereign power that prevent them from saving a way of life that respects law."



"I cannot believe that there are principles of law that say we must accept destruction of our way of life--I just cannot believe it."

Mr. Acheson said international law did play a part in the Cuban quarantine strategy and development --the important procedural role that law often plays.

Legal considerations were involved in the steps for approval of the quarantine by the Organization of American States. Legal avenues, Mr. Acheson said, permitted wise delay and consideration of the views of other governments.

Abram J. Chayes, legal adviser of the State Department, said "law was an important consideration" in the quarantine decision. The long-run goals of the United States, he said, would have been damaged by a cynical disregard for law.

Mr. Chayes asserted that the quarantine was sustainable under established principles of international law. He relied primarily, as Governments of-  
ficials have in comments since the episode, on the authorization of the O.A.S.

However, Mr. Chayes, like Mr. Acheson, declared that it was foolish to ask such questions as, "Was the quarantine legal?" He said the first year of law school was supposed to teach lawyers not to ask generalized questions like that.

In domestic law, Mr. Chayes said, the whole effect of the judicial system is to refine and focus questions and get away from such abstractions. Since international law has no effective judicial remedies in most cases, he continued, it is up to international lawyers to do the refining and focusing--not "to deal at large with such deep policy questions."

Professor Wright accepted Mr. Chayes' contention that the vote of the Organization of American States authorized action against Cuba herself, since Cuba was a signatory to the O.A.S. treaty. But he said it was not a basis for action against ships of a third party, the Soviet Union.



Mr. Chayes contended that this approach produced the absurd result that it would be "illegal" to block Soviet ships en route to Cuba but "legal" to bomb anything in Cuba, or her territorial waters, including Soviet ships.



# The U-2 and the Cuban Crisis

collateral

1. Negative evidence on ~~agent~~ reports (spring 1962).
2. Negative on ~~building~~ missile reports, 5 Aug. (and on buildup?)
3. Positive on SAMs, negative on MREMs, 29 Aug and 4 Sept.
4. Alleged: McN, JFK relied heavily on photos, little on reports ("not evidence").
5. 30 Aug ~~and~~; U-2 overflight of Sakhalin; Sept 8, U-2 shot down over China; & 31 Aug, 7 Sept evidence of SAMs, no evidence of MREMs---planned flight Sept 10 cancelled (why?): meeting of Sept 10.
  - a) sensitivity to incidents; b) little prob of MREMs: 1) no evidence (assumption that they couldn't appear soon?), plus evidence of SAMs with which to discount agent reports; 3) expert disbelief (ONE, except for McC); 4) political disbelief (especially, wishfully, after we had announced?)
  - c) appearance of SAMs (especially in area where reports indicated possible site).

This led to desire



Komer, 27 March 64

On communication between Allies:

On Cyprus, our interests were not identical with British. But we had a good plan; which was held up for 10(?) days because we had failed to communicate with British, "educate" them (to a degree that was possible despite some difference in interest). Simply didn't get around to it? (British wouldn't accept, or had plan of their own?)



1709

$$630 \times 11 = 6930$$

$$80 \times 13 = 1040$$

$$MM \ 600 \times 1.1 = 660$$

$$283 \times 1 = 283$$

$$126 \times 4.5 = 567$$

$$108 \times 9 = 972$$

$$10,397 \quad 2927$$

1972  $1000 \times 1.1 = 1100$

$$656 \times 1.4 = 918.4$$

$$10,397 \overline{) 17,560} \\ \underline{10,397} \\ 7,163$$

79.5%

1972

$$2326 / 11340$$

$$1144 / 2224$$

$$2185 / 4543$$

1964

$$4275 / 13650$$

$$2176 / 41543$$

$$2443 / 2714$$

630

11

630

$$\frac{630}{6930}$$

80

3

240

80

$$\frac{80}{1040}$$

4.5

126

270

90

45

$$\frac{45}{567.0}$$

108

9

$$\frac{108}{972}$$



1960  
 447  
 111

that

63                      64                      67  
 3191/3897      2072/5110      2753/1026

1961

1962

72

miss 398/337                      495/982                      2972/6150  
 air 209/293                      317/354  
 557/630                      557/336

under (7592/20082)                      (5172/10963)  
 (2281 tons)

that 63                      64  
 5238/14515                      5718/15764  
 (in 9275/13050)  
 miss 1471/2714

1964

6592/14438                      5257/10777

1097/2396

426/425

1524/2381

67

72

5536/11972

3501/12383

(8192/13357)

(3451/8892)  
 2135/3081

(2026/1134)  
 2125/4543

Rates projected 25% drop from  
 1961 to 1963 (actual about 40%)  
 (as of Aug 8, 1960; drop into 14363;  
 599 x 19

19



73

B-52 approved + TFG

630

JCS

B-47 (225 in 65, cut in 66)

B-58 approved + TFG

66

JCS

62

AMSA CSAF

71  
15

105

Atlas JCS

72

(down from 125 in 64)

TFG

0 (cut in 68)

Titan

TFG

54

I

(down from 108 in 64 to 54 in 65)

MM I approved

72  
400

73

JCS

100

TFG

?

Total MM-73

MM I approved

800

1200

CSAF

~~1500~~

1500

WFO

1200

1500

TFG

?

1200

1000



*Final 88*  
*La Jolla* 27  
(draft of instructions to Finletter, Oct 26?) *7/26/62*

1. Last public letter of K indicates willingness to trade withdrawal of offensive missiles in Cuba for withdrawal of Jupiters in Turkey.
2. While we remain hopeful that deal can be made for denuclearizing Cuba on US promise to guarantee Cuba's territorial integrity we must realistically be prepared for possible deal to trade removal Turkish Jupiters for Cuban missiles.
3. This can be done without adversely disturbing balance nuclear power since obsolete Jupiters can be replaced by Polaris in Eastern Med.
4. Immediate problem is to persuade NATO powers US is not capitulating nor is it trading away Europe's security to advance its own.
5. Among arguments to be made are following:
  - a) Existence of bases on the periphery of SU have long been an irritant and source of tension.
  - b) Sov nuclear power on the doorstep of the US is a menace to all NATO countries. This constitutes very large increment to Sov ability to destroy nuclear retaliatory power which is the central core of NATO security.
  - c) Because the US cannot accept this menace the alternatives are either a negotiated deal or a US air strike and probable invasion of Cuba.
  - d) Such a military action would mean great risk for all NATO countries. First, it would almost certainly invite Sov response elsewhere either against the Jupiter bases in Turkey and Italy or against Berlin or some other NATO target. Second it would immobilize substantial US forces possibly for a substantial period of time. Third it would involve a grave danger of escalation.
6. With the beginning today of Cuban action against US planes engaged in necessary surveillance of work on Cuban missile sites, the consequent destruction of an American U2 and the risk of increased losses in next two or three days with pressure for retaliation the situation is becoming hourly more grave and the President must have adequate freedom of action if he is to find a ~~xxxxx~~ solution through negotiation.
7. In view of these circumstances regard it as urgent that you convene NAC meeting for Sunday afternoon.



Oct 27, 9:29 pm from USUN

Zorin claimed Oct 26 letter to President was confidential message and was designed to "reduce tensions." Substantive proposal, he maintained, was in Oct 27 letter which was published.

Oct 28, 12:25 am; for Bohlen from Pres

Go to Colombey Sunday with letter and briefing material to Finletter: I am asking Amb. Bohlen to make sure that you are fully informed of the current situation in Cuba. The situation is clearly growing more tense and if satisfactory responses are not received from the other side in the next forty-eight hours ((from Sunday?)) the situation is likely to enter a progressively intense military phase.

We are trying to make our determination just as clear as our readiness for a proper settlement. It gives me great courage in these days to know that we have your support, as expressed in your last interview with Amb. Bohlen, and I should be glad to know of any further views you may have. ((drafted by Bundy, Johnson))

same to Dowling.

at same time: Oct 26 letter sent to Macmillan and de Gaulle.



McG-Dob, June 14

(end): The Amb expressed his admiration for the political leadership of the Pres, and asked me who I thought would win the Congressional elections in November. I told him that this was a question he should put to others, and we parted as cheerfully as we began.

((subject of elections, so far as record shows, always brought up by Russians))

14

Aug. 22, Schlesinger, Dob

1. The Amb's chief interest was evidently in American domestic politics. He asked me a number of questions about the prospects of the autumn elections, the strength of conservatism in the Congress, the power of the John Birch Society, etc. In answer I tried to remind him of the ebb and flow of American politics. ...

Oct 10, Thompson-Dob

T. asked when K was likely to come. Dob said this had not yet been decided in Moscow. When I said the rumors seem to indicate the latter part of November, he added "or early December."

Dob then asked for my personal opinion as to the wisdom of such a visit at this time. ... I went on to say that frequent contacts between the President and Mr K would be helpful as I was convinced that many misunderstandings existed and that at least some of these could be cleared up through closer contact. On the other hand, I said he must be aware of the feeling aroused in this country by developments in Cuba, which did not provide a very good background against which to discuss other questions. I also said I could not observe, in the exchanges which we had had so far, much hope for a successful settlement of the Berlin question.

D. indicated he agreed with this view and said that such a meeting was bound to generate hopes which might result in disappointment. He also mentioned the imminence of American elections.

I pointed out that Sec. Rusk ~~xxx~~ had told Mr. Gromyko that our elections need play no role in negotiations about Berlin, but said that the Republican Party apparently intended to exploit the Cuban issue in the coming campaign, which might further arouse ~~xx~~ public sentiment. Mr. D said purely from the point of view of elections, he assumed that next Fall would be the ideal time for a meeting, but then went on to indicate his own view that early December of this year might be an appropriate time. My impression is that he will recommend against any visit at this time but that if K insists on coming, it should be some time in early December.



Sept. 11 INR memo to Sec on Tass statement

Sov warning to US and promises of support for Cuba came two weeks after Pres publicly announced that the US had no intention of invading Cuba ((see statement to Gromyko, Oct 18)) and one week after he stressed the US view that Soviet weapons being sent to Cuba are defensive in character. Thus Moscow seems to be using its long-standing device of offering to fight when it has been given assurances that it will not have to. ((not quite!)) K's promise of support for Communist China ~~xx~~ last June after the Pres and the US Amb in Warsaw had reassured Peiping ~~xxxxxx~~ and the world at large of US intentions ~~xx~~ are illustrative in this respect.

The warnings and the insistence on the USSR's "right" to protect Cuba are in part offset by Moscow's apparent readiness to wait out the US elections in November before insisting on further negotiations in Germany. Action on a peace treaty, though not necessarily in Berlin itself, is thus postponed again ~~xx~~ until additional negotiations have taken place. This would seem to push the next potential deadline, if any, for a peace treaty into 1963. It may also prove ~~xx~~ to be significant that the statement includes no threat of a separate peace treaty with East Germany should negotiations fail.

Significance of the November Date:

The decision to relax pressure ~~xx~~ for a Berlin "settlement" until the November elections supplements a growing list of recent references to November in Soviet/GDR planning on Berlin. (There were, however, intelligence reports as early as April indicating that the Soviets estimated President Kennedy would be unable to negotiate seriously on Berlin until the 1962 congressional elections were out of the way.) There have been several reports--including the most recent GDR defector comments--that operational plans for the Sov and GDR armed forces in Germany, plans seemingly geared to a Berlin move, are scheduled for completion in November. Amb Dobbs' comments to Amb Stevenson that K would not appear at the UN "before mid-November"--if he came--would also seem to fit into this pattern.

Although the specific thrust of Soviet intentions still remain unclear, it would not be surprising if some new Soviet initiative on Berlin is to come in November or thereabouts, possibly involving an effort to secure a summit meeting between K and Pres.

The ~~xxxxxx~~ Sov statement is Moscow's first overt move to establish a direct link between the Berlin and Cuban crises.

...statement suggests that Moscow is aware that a drastic heightening of tension simultaneously in Berlin and Cuba may lead to US reactions (especially in the atmosphere of an election campaign) whose consequences might be difficult to control.... Moreover, Moscow may want to leave the inference that US acquiescence in the close Soviet-Cuban relationship... might elicit Soviet restraint in Berlin.

((If you don't provoke Cuban crisis before elections, we won't ~~xxx~~ push Berlin till then--you will have quiet time. ))



Oct 6, 1962: Sov mission, NY. Rusk, Stev, Davis, Hillenbrand,  
; Gromyko, Semenov

Sec pointed out that we were prepared to sit down and analyze all questions, both central and peripheral, at any time, so as to see where the points of agreement or disagreement lay. As far as U.S. elections were concerned, the Sec pointed out that our government was in business and there was no need to wait. By direction of the President, the Secretary of State was to stay out of the elections and there was no point in having a crisis by appointment in November. We were prepared to analyze the situation at any time with Mr. Gromyko or through whatever other channel might be profitable.

...Mr. G then recalled the Secretary's remark that there was no need to wait for the November elections and said that he would take note of that statement. While he did not believe that the situation in this respect was as simple as that, he did understand what the Secretary had in mind. On the part of the SU there had never been any lack of readiness to exchange views on the questions the two sides were facing, if the situation really warranted such an exchange.

Oct. 10: Dobrynin-Thompson lunch, 1 pm, Sov Emb.

Oct. 13, Dob.--Stev



Oct 13, Bowles - Dob

(first time they had talked; Bowles leaving for Africa)  
(Dob had asked for lunch a week earlier)

Almost immediately Dob brought up the question of Cuba and expressed worry and surprise at the intensity of US public reaction.

In response to his question as to why we attached such importance to a relatively small island, I outlined the history of US-Cuba relations and drew a parallel to the situation in 1898, the presence of Spanish misrule, and the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ US public agitation that abetted the outbreak of war.

When he protested that the Soviet presence in Cuba was no greater provocation than the US presence in Turkey, I pointed out that the present Administration had inherited a status quo that had grown up since the war. In some areas the advantage in this status quo had been with us, in others with Moscow; in still others it was a stand-off.

Our presence in Greece and Turkey, for instance, represented our reaction to Stalin's military and political pressures against these two countries following the war. It had become part of a status quo which in all its complexity could safely be changed only by negotiation with reciprocal benefits to each side.

...However, in Cuba the USSR had unilaterally altered this status quo by introducing a wholly new element. Our reaction, in these circumstances, should have been foreseeable.

Moreover, many US students of Sov affairs were soberly convinced that the SU had made this move deliberately to provoke a US military response against Cuba on the theory that this would divert our energies from Berlin, and elsewhere, and enable Sov spokesmen to charge us with aggression in the UN. ((who?))

If this kind of thinking had in fact played a part in the Sov analysis, it was extremely dangerous. If we did move into Cuba in response to some overt act or offensive build-up by the SU, a global chain of events might be set in motion which could have catastrophic consequences.

For instance, the Sovs might then be tempted to take what they would term "counter-action" in Berlin and perhaps Turkey; and the US, by that time in an extremely tense mood, would react with vigor.

The SU, in turn, would feel pressed by the Chinese and other extremists to counter our moves, and we would be on our way together down the long slippery slide.

(discusses the Guns of August) I asked D if he had read The Guns of August. He said, "only a three-page summary." I urged him to read at least the first few chapters in which he would see a pattern of politico-military action and counter-action that could be repeated in the next six months.

In July 1914, men of intelligence in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and England, all quite conscious of the forces which were feeding the approaching holocaust, found themselves enmeshed in internal pressures, commitments and precedents which left them powerless to avoid the inevitable. It would be the greatest folly in history if we were to repeat this insane process in the nuclear age.



2. Dob: Bowles

Dob asked me what, in the circumstances, I thought could be done in regard to Cuba. Stressing that I was speaking solely as an individual, I suggested three moves that the SU could sponsor to ease the situation.

1. Dob should remind his government of Pres Kennedy's sharp distinction between defensive and offensive weapons in his recent statement. I was particularly concerned on this point because current reports indicated that Sov shipments were in fact beginning to include weapons which had a clearly offensive capacity.

If this continued, it could produce--with the help of some incident perpetrated perhaps by individuals striving to provoke another "Remember the Maine" incident--the very conflict which the Administration is anxious to avoid. Pres Kennedy had committed himself to act under certain specific circumstances. This was a clear commitment, and the SU should not take it lightly.

2. From many reports, Castro now had ample defensive arms with which to protect himself from casual landings. The SU should tell him that under present circumstances no more arms will be shipped. The SU should then ask Castro himself to make a statement announcing that the defense of Cuba was assured and that no more arms were needed. Moscow could then inform us that no more arms would be shipped.

3. Castro should be asked by Moscow to state that he has no design on his neighbors...

To all of this D appeared to listen intently. I believe he was impressed.

He answered that in spite of our worries, the USSR was not shipping offensive weapons and well understood the dangers of doing so. Moreover, it was unreasonable for the US, as a major power, to expect a small weak country such as Cuba to make such public concessions to US public opinion even though both the SU and Cuba might accept all three points in principle.

Why, he asked repeatedly, do we get so excited about so small a nation?...

I commented... If Dob were misinformed about the types of weapons now arriving in Cuba, it would not be the first time in diplomatic history that this had occurred.

... In the course of his many questions and comments, D stressed what he called the Sov Gov's desire for better understanding, its inability to fathom US public opinion, its irritation over the fact that we are constantly saying "wait until after the election--and you are always having elections," ((so far as I have seen, US never brought this up; SU always did. Were they telling Dob that we were obsessed with this? Who believed it in Moscow? Were we bringing it up, in other talks?)) its concern over its own internal needs, and its rejection of my "thesis that the USSR, Cuba or someone else should make all the concessions."

...Our reactions to Cuba appear to have surprised him, and he is frankly at a loss now to explain them. He returned to this question again and again.

((Then, suppose he had known of plans; would he have predicted strong US reaction, advised against them?))



Presumably, by Oct 13 B knew of 11-28's and was referring to them (published on 11 Oct); presumably he would not have known (?) of reports on missiles.

D's assurance, in context, is pretty definite. B's comment is the only one I saw where anyone even raised the possibility that D might not know; though this took place after Oct 11, by which time D's comment appeared definitely wrong.

If reported immediately, B's proposal would have suggested: We will accept 11-28's, if you don't send any more.

(memo sent to Pres when written, on Oct 14. )

(only assurances in Aug and Sept influenced Pres reaction up to Sept 13; Dob-Sorenson Aug 23 and Sept 6; Dob-Stevenson Sept 6



Kohler-Khrushchev, 16 Oct

K: US has bases in countries neighboring USSR, such as Turkey, as well as in Greece, Italy, France, West Germany and Pakistan. But USSR does not attack these countries. If US thinks it has right to do as it likes about Cuba, why hasn't USSR right to do as it likes about these countries? If we acted that way, might would make right. UN charter would lose its force. That would be policy of banditry. Cuba is small; US is big. "You are so afraid of Cuba, you almost lost your pants." US is located in Western Hemisphere; what is it doing in Eastern Hemisphere? USSR does not recognize right of US to be everywhere in world and to rule everywhere. It was one thing when US was very powerful, but now there is a force as great as yours.

...Kon: took note of Chairman's remarks. Pres has made it clear we are not going to interfere in Cuba by force, But we are not going to help Cuba, which does not mean we intend to interfere there.

Reverting to Cuba, K said he wished to assure Pres that port regarding which Sovs had signed agreement was just a fishing port. "I give you my word." He said he would reveal a state secret. While he was away, they had signed agreement without consulting him. When he came back he cursed them and said they should have waited until after US elections. Japanese fish off Brazil and have a base there where fish are processed. Cubans couldn't build port themselves so Sovs decided to help them. But agreement had been signed at wrong time. If they had asked him, he would have said sign it November 10 or 15, because he knew it would provide fuel to Republicans who are frying President at the moment. Since Soviets value good relations with President, they could have waited to sign. (Kuznetsov changed "signed" to "published" when interpreter translated this).

Kon: thanked him for these remarks and said I thought Pres would be glad to hear them.

K: perhaps Pres would think he had concluded this agreement on purpose just to "put a little salt in his wound." Koh: said I believed Pres was a little surprised.

K said, "And rightfully so," adding that when Soviets do a silly thing they recognize it as such, but Americans don't.

K then said that perhaps after elections he would meet Pres in New York and they would reach agreement on nuclear-test ban.

...After this problem, most important is question of Germany-Berlin. ...Some people say that he has told foreign delegations that Pres did not dare to start a war, but they interpret him wrongly. He does not want to say something offensive to Pres and his remarks have been distorted. When he talks with foreigners, he says Soviets will sign a peace treaty, with all the consequences that would follow, and he also says that any war would inevitably grow into nuclear war. Consequently, anyone who would start a war would be either a lunatic or a coward.

...We will sign a peace treaty, but no one who is sane will start a war.

...US elections will take place, and then we'll try to renew dialogue and reach agreement. Sovs won't sign peace treaty immediately; they know unilateral signing would be aggravation.

over



K said probably he would travel to UNGA at end November. Early in Nov, he would be busy with domestic problems. If situation were favorable then, he would be glad to meet with Pres. He had good recollections meeting with Pres. Then perhaps they could: 1) agree on test ban, which he would like to do; 2) exchange views on disarmament; and 3) he would also like to agree on West Berlin and create a calmer atmosphere for disarmament. For time being, Soviets would do nothing and make no statements until elections. He had given his word on that.

Koh: said I would hope meanwhile there would be no developments which would make a meeting difficult. (mentioned Gromyko was to see Pres day after tomorrow).

K repeated that they would not undertake anything to worsen relations. He regretted that things had not worked out in accordance with his discussion with Amb Thompson. It was regrettable that Cuban question had blown up right in middle of election campaign.

(K noted that he had not known earlier that appointment was fixed for Gromyko with Pres. I said we had just learned this today. K said he was glad and thanked Pres for finding time to receive G).

K asked me to convey best wishes to Pres and hope that he would have success in election campaign, as well as wishes for good health and success to his family, his wife and mother.

(Koh note: clear ~~in~~ that he has as of now made basic decision to make the trip.)



Gromyko--JFK, Oct 18, 5 pm (Pres, SecState, Thompson, Hillenbrand;  
Gromyko, Semenov, Dobrynin

Mr. G then said that the Soviet Government had already indicated that it would do nothing with regard to West Berlin before the US elections, unless it was compelled to do otherwise by the activities of the other side. However, the Sov Gov proceeded from the fact that it was necessary to hold an active dialogue in November to bring about concrete results with regard to a German peace treaty and to the normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. The Sov Gov would like to hope that at that time an understanding concerning a German peace treaty...would at last be reached. IF there should be no such understanding, the Soviet Government would be compelled, and Mr G wished to emphasize the word "compelled", to sign, together with a number of other states, a peace treaty with the GDR without an understanding with the Western Powers. The SU would also be compelled to take such steps as were integrally linked with a peace settlement, steps of which the US and the Pres personally had been informed on a number of occasions, including by Mr K personally.

...G : the Pres had said that if the Sov proposal were to be accepted ((without US troops)) West Berlin would ~~be taken over~~ come under the control of the GDR and that the social order of West Berlin would be threatened by this. Mr G asserted that there was no reason for such fears, or doubts, or suspicions, because the USSR was prepared to undertake solemn guarantees, together with the US and the other Western Powers and also with the UN, ensuring respect for the status of West Berlin. He professed not to be able to understand why the Pres believed that the collective weight and prestige of those nations or the weight and prestige of the UN would not constitute sufficient guarantees of what the President called the freedom of West Berlin. ((This on Oct 18!))

...Pres emphasized that if the SU desired to continue to permit the people of West Berlin to choose their fate, he did not see why withdrawal of Western forces was of any importance. ...West Berlin was not a NATO base and our troops there were symbolic. ...a symbolic guarantee of the freedom of the city.

...

...(K believed Heads of State should meet to discuss the problems which were dividing the two Powers, and first and foremost the question of a German peace treaty and of West Berlin. If Mr. K should have an opportunity of doing so, he would come to New York in the latter part of November in connection with General Assembly. Thus, what was meant was the possibility of K's coming after the US elections.



2.

G proceeded with prepared text on Cuba.

...For quite some time there had been an unabated anti-Cuban campaign in the US, a campaign which was apparently backed by the USG. Now the USG wished to institute a blockade against trade with Cuba, and there had also been some talk of organized piracy under the aegis of United States. All this could lead only to great misfortunes for mankind. The USG seemed to believe that the Cubans must settle their internal affairs not at their own discretion, but at the discretion of the US. Yet Cuba belonged to Cubans and not to the US. If this was so, why then statements were being made in the US advocating invasion of Cuba? What did the US want to do with Cuba? What could Cuba do to the US?

... All international problems must be resolved by negotiation between the states concerned. After all, the US and USSR were now negotiating and making statements which should be given credence. Was it not sufficient for Cuba to state that it wished negotiations and a solution of existing problems on a mutually acceptable basis?

Mr. G said he knew the Pres appreciated frankness. Mr. K's conversation with the Pres at Vienna had been frank and therefore, with the Pres's permission, he himself wished to be frank, too. The situation today could not be compared to that obtaining in the middle of the 19th century. Modern times were not the same as those when colonies had been divided among colonial powers. Modern times could not be compared to those when it took weeks or months for the voice of the attacked to be heard. Statements had been made that the US was a powerful and great nation; this was true, but what kind of a nation was the USSR? Mr K had been favorably impressed with the President's statement at Vienna regarding the equality of forces of our two nations. Since this was so, i.e., since the USSR was also a great and strong nation, it could not stand by as a mere observer when aggression was planned and when a threat of war was looming. The USG was surely aware of the SU's attitude toward the recent call-up of 150,000 Reservists in the US.

((What had led to that?)) The SG believed that if both sides were for relaxation of international tensions and for solving the outstanding international problems, such demonstrations could be designed only for the purpose of increasing tensions and should therefore be avoided. If worse should come to worse and if war should occur, then surely 150,000 soldiers would be of no significance. As the Pres was surely aware, today was not 1812, when Napoleon had relied on the number of soldiers, sabres and rifles. Neither could today's situation be compared to 1941, when Hitler had relied on the number of tanks and guns. Today, life itself and military technology had created an entirely different situation, where it was better not to rely on arms. As to Soviet assistance to Cuba, Mr G stated that he was instructed to make it clear, as the Sov Gov had already done, that such assistance, pursued solely for the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba and to the development of Cuba, toward the development of its agriculture and land amelioration, and training by Sov specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments were by no means offensive. If it were otherwise, the Sov Gov would have never become involved in rendering such assistance.



### 3. G-JFK

Pres said he was glad that Mr. G had referred to Laos because he believed that the Sov policy on that problem was as Mr. G described it. So far the SU had apparently met its obligations just as the US had met them. However, a most serious mistake had been made last summer with respect to Cuba. The US had not pressed the Cuban problem and had attempted to push it aside although of course a number of people in this country opposed the regime now prevailing in Cuba and there were many refugees coming to this country. However, there was no intention to invade Cuba. But then last July the USSR, without any communication from Mr. K to the Pres, had embarked upon the policy of supplying arms to Cuba. The Pres said he did not know the reasons for that shift in Sov policy, because there was no threat of invasion and he would have been glad to give appropriate assurances to that effect had Mr. K communicated with him. Sov arms supply had a profound impact in the United States; Amb Dobrynin was surely aware of how the American people and the Congress felt on this matter. The admin had tried to calm this reaction and he, the Pres, had made a statement that in view of the nature of Sov assistance to Cuba at this time coolness was required. Yet, the Pres said, he wished to stress that Sov actions were extremely serious and he could find no satisfactory explanation for them. The Sov Union was surely aware of US feelings with regard to Cuba, which was only 90 miles away from the US. The Pres continued that the US planned no blockade of Cuba; it was only a question of ships taking arms to Cuba not being able to stop in the US with their return cargo. Thus a very unfortunate situation had developed. The Pres said he did not know where it was taking us but it was the most dangerous situation since the end of the war. The US had taken the Sov statement concerning the nature of the armaments supplied to Cuba at its face value. ((How strong was influence of these statements on our beliefs?)) He, the Pres, had attacked last Sunday in Indianapolis a Senator who was advocating invasion, ((see)) and he had stated that the Cuban problem must be kept in perspective. The Pres reiterated that this was a dangerous situation, and said he did not know where the USSR planned to have it end.

Mr. G said that there had already been an invasion, and it was well known how it ended. It was well known now, both from facts and statements, including the President's own, under what circumstances and by whom that invasion had been organized. ....

The Pres interjected that he had discussed with Mr. K the April, 1961 invasion and had said that it was a mistake. He also pointed out he would have given assurances that there would be no further invasion, either by refugees or by US forces. But last July the SU took certain actions and the situation changed.

...Mr. G continued... also, as far as armaments were concerned, Soviet specialists were training Cubans in handling certain types of armaments which were only defensive--and he wished to stress the word defensive--in character, and thus such training could not constitute a threat to the US. He reiterated that if it were otherwise the SU would never have agreed to render such assistance.



4.

The Pres said that in order to be clear on this Cuban problem he wanted to state the following. The US had no ~~intention~~ intention of invading Cuba. Introduction last July of intensive armaments had complicated the situation and created grave danger. His own actions had been to prevent, unless US security was endangered, anything from being done that might provoke the danger of war. The Pres then read a portion of his Sept 4 statement on Cuba and stated that this had been US position and policy on this question. He noted that the Attorney General had discussed the Cuban situation with Amb Dob so that the latter must be aware of what it was. The Pres again recalled his Indianapolis speech of Sunday ((see)) and said that we were basing our present attitude on facts as they had been described by Mr. Gromyko; our presumption was that the armaments supplied by the USSR were defensive.

Mr. G stated the SU proceeded from the assumption that on basis of SG's statements and his own today the US Gov and the Pres had a clear idea of the Sov policy on this matter and of the Sov evaluation of US action in relation to Cuba. He said he had nothing to add to what he had already said.

...(end) The Pres emphasized that neither he nor Mr. K must take actions leading to a confrontation of our two countries. ...What was inexplicable in the light of what he had thought to be Mr. K's understanding of the US was what had happened in Cuba since July. Since Laos, that particular situation had been the most serious one.

ended at 7:20

Oct 22: Sec called Amb Dob in at 6 pm . (Dob ~~was~~ read letter from Pres to K and copy of address which Pres would make at 7; asked whether letter from Pres would be published and was told that the USG has no intention of ~~publishing~~ at this time of publishing it and would inform Sovs if this decision were changed.) Sec said that he had not been instructed to add any comments and that the speech was self-explanatory. Speaking informally, the Sec said that it was incomprehensible to him how the leaders in Moscow could make such a gross error of judgment as to what the US could accept. He expressed the hope that the SU would make a major effort to correct the situation.

Dob said that "all of this" was unjustifiable and would very strongly aggravate the international situation. He said that he would report the messages and the conversation promptly.  
(present: Guthrie, Baraz)



My dear friend: We are now in possession of incontrovertible military  
Letters to Macmillan, ~~de Gaulle, Adenauer~~  
(drafted by Johnson)

~~Incontrovertible~~ evidence that the Sovs have already installed  
offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, and that some of these may  
already be operational. This constitutes a threat to the peace  
not only of this hemisphere but of the entire free world.

(to Mac: You will recall that last month I stated publicly that  
the government of the US would consider the presence of ground-  
to-ground missiles in Cuba as an offensive threat. In response to  
my remarks, the Sovs stated that such armaments and military  
equipment as had been shipped by them to Cuba were exclusively  
of a defensive nature, and this was repeated to me only last Thursday  
by Gromyko under instructions.

The foregoing has created a highly critical situation which  
must be met promptly and fearlessly.

...I am quite clear in my mind that these missiles have got  
to be withdrawn,...

The object of the quarantine, which will be put into effect  
immediately, is to prevent the SU from introducing additional  
missiles into Cuba and to lead to the elimination of the  
missiles that are already in place.

...I need not point out to you the possible relation of this  
secret and dangerous move on the part of Khrushchev to Berlin.  
We must together be prepared for a time of testing.

...This is a solemn moment for our two countries, indeed for the fate  
of the entire world. It is essential that the already great dangers  
before us should not be increased through miscalculation or  
underestimating by the Soviets of what we intend to do, and are  
prepared to endure, in the face of the course on which they have  
so recklessly embarked.



Oct 21, 7:41 pm (Thompson drafter)  
deliver one hour before speech, 7 pm Oct 22

Sir:

There is attached a copy of the statement I am making tonight ((change to: A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington (prefer that K not have immediately available full text of statement: Oct 22, 8 1 pm))

. In view of the gravity of developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government on this matter.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the US in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made it clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the US could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the US would resist with all the power at its command.

It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the US would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the US is determined to remove this threat to the security of this hemisphere.

((change, Oct 22, 9:56 am: I must tell you that the US is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed.))

At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgement on your part.

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.



Oct 23; received 11:50 am  
(Kuznetsov informed Kohler letter would not be published "for the time being.")

Mr. President.

I have just received your letter, and have also acquainted myself with text of your speech of October 22 regarding Cuba.

I would say frankly that measures outlined in your statement represent serious threat to peace and security of peoples. US has openly taken path of gross violation of charter of UN, path of violation of international norms of freedom of navigation on high seas, path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against SU.

Statement of Government of US cannot be evaluated in any other way than as naked interference in domestic affairs of Cuban Republic, SU, and other states. Charter of UN and international norms do not give right to any state whatsoever to establish in international waters control of vessels bound for shores of Cuban Republic.

It is self-understood that we also cannot recognize right of US to establish control over armaments essential to Republic of Cuba for strengthening of its defensive capacity.

We confirm that armaments now on Cuba, regardless of classification to which they belong, are destined exclusively for defensive purposes, in order to secure Cuban Republic from attack of aggressor.

I hope that Government of US will show prudence and renounce actions pursued by you, which could lead to catastrophic consequences for peace throughout world.

Viewpoint of Soviet Government with regard to your statement of Oct 22 is set forth in statement of Soviet Government which is being conveyed ~~through~~ to you through your ambassador in Moscow.

Oct 23, 6:51 pm

Dear Mr. Chairman :

I have received your letter of Oct 23. I think you will recognize that the steps which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is.

I hope that you will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the quarantine, the basis of which was established by the vote of the OAS this afternoon, and which will go into effect at 1400 hours Greenwich time Oct 24. Sincerely,



Soviet Government statement, Oct 23

...The Sov Gov emphasizes once again that all weapons in the Soviet Union's possession are serving and will serve the purposes of defence against aggressors. Under existing international conditions, the presence of powerful weapons, including nuclear rocket weapons, in the Soviet Union is acknowledged by all the peoples in the world to be the decisive factor in deterring the aggressive forces of imperialism from unleashing a world war of annihilation.

...  
The US Government accuses Cuba of creating a threat to the security of the US. But who is going to believe that Cuba can be a threat to the US? If we think of the respective size and resources of the two countries, of their armaments, no statesman in his right mind can imagine for one moment that Cuba can be a threat to the US or to any other country. It is hypocritical, to say the least, to say that little Cuba may encroach on the security of the USA.

((But suppose they put 200 missiles there. Sovs could easily and quickly put more MRBMs into Cuba than US had ICBMs or Polaris. Sovs were not being reassuring as to numbers. ?

Were we considering question of numbers or significance?))

((If all weapons of SU are "defensive," then what is information content of statements that SU was putting "only" defensive weapons there? What was being ruled out? Form of statements certainly implied that something was being said about type of weapons, in response to US distinctions.

If ICBMs in SU are deterrent to aggression against Cuba, why need MRBMs in Cuba--especially controlled by Soviets?))

With regard to the SU's assistance to Cuba, this assistance is exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity. As was stated on 3 September 1962...the SG has responded to the Cuban Government's request to help Cuba with arms. The communique states that such arms and military equipment are intended solely for defensive purposes. ((check))

...The US is demanding that the military equipment Cuba needs for its own defense should be withdrawn from its territory, a step to which no State prizing its independence can, of course, agree.



3.

Oct 25, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the US would regard any any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurances from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by Tass in September, you will see how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied--namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of ~~these~~ this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours,



Oct 26, 1962: On K's conversation with W.E. Knox, Westinghouse Electrical International, Moscow, Oct. 24.

(conversation including Davis, Guthrie, Sheridan, Sonnenfeldt)

1. K was loath to think that what occurred on Oct 22 was done for electoral reasons. It appeared to stem from hysteria. The President was very young man; in fact K's own son was older. K had had his differences with Eisenhower but was confident that Eisenhower would have done things differently. ((! Why? How? note E recommendations))

2. Except in time of war a blockade is illegal. If the US stopped and searched Sov ships, this would be piracy.

3. K repeated several times that Sov ships were unarmed, that some may turnaround and that some would be stopped, but sooner or later the SU would send its submarines to sink the ships that were stopping the Sov ships.

4. The US is now unable to take over Cuba.

5. To Mr. Knox's comment that the President was infuriated because he had been assured that the SU would not send offensive weapons to Cuba and found that he had been lied to, K replied with a half hour discussion on the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. ((Did he deny lying?)) The US said that its Turkish bases were defensive but what was the range of the missiles there.

6. K then stated specifically that the SU had an anti-aircraft missile in Cuba as well as ballistic missiles with both conventional and nuclear warheads. The Cubans were too temperamental to turn over these weapons to them; for this reason all sophisticated military equipment were under direct, 100 percent Soviet control. They would never be fired except in defense of Cuba and then only on the personal instructions from K as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. K added that if the US did not believe this it should attack Cuba and it would find out the answer. Guantanamo would disappear the first day.

((Note: significance of shootdown on 27 Oct in light of K's emphasis here and Oct 27 morning on his personal, and Soviet's responsibility'. Also, concern for "temperamental" Cubans; and report that Mikoyan was representing concern for their action after Oct 28))

7. K would like to talk with the President. He had planned to attend the UN this fall, but the UN is a place for arguing, not a place for negotiating. He would be delighted to visit the Pres or for the Pres to visit him or a rendezvous at sea or anywhere else. A summit was desirable and it should not be a circus.

8. What occurred on Oct 22 was particularly disappointing because Rusk and Gromyko had practically agreed on the nuclear test problem, on the Polish-German and Czech-German frontier, and on non-dissemination of hostile propaganda in both East and West Berlin.

9 K told his familiar story about a man who had learned to get along with a smelly goat even though he did not like the goat. The SU had its goats in Italy, Greece, etc. and was living with them. The US now had its goat in Cuba.



Oct 27, 1962. Con, Aleksandr Fomin, Counselor; SOV--James Ramsey

long talk on evening of October 27. Mr. Fomin took a very gloomy view of the situation, saying it was fraught with all kinds of dangers. He complained that there seemed to be a lack of communications between our two countries on problems currently troubling us and suggested specifically that there should be more direct contact between Ambs Thompson and Dobrynin. He proposed exploratory conversations which would have as their objective a search for possible areas of compromise.

Max Fomin stated that the personality of the President was a factor which introduced great complications into the situation and possibly lay at the root of the trouble. He said that the Pres had a "dam or die" attitude and quoted several instances of what he considered intemperate behavior on his part. These were: the feud with Broynhill in Virginia, the dispute with the steel companies, and the incident in Oxford, Miss. Mr. F expressed the opinion that the President need not have let such issues come to an open conflict since there had been other possibilities open to him for handling them. He drew an analogy between these examples and the White House's handling of the most pressing problems in which the USSR was vitally interested. Mr. F said that the President, being Irish, was very headstrong and determined to have his way at all costs. When queried as to what he thought would be the best way of reacting to the actions of a President such as he had described, Mr. F made some equivocal remarks which could be interpreted as indicating a lack of decision on this point.

Mr. F said that the Cuba for Turkey proposal should be considered as a serious offer. He stressed repeatedly that the USSR was seeking equality of treatment on the international scene and that the American people should now finally understand what it meant to have missiles of a foreign power pointed at their country from a neighboring state of minor dimensions. He said his government was flexible on the details of any agreement and would not be demanding in terms of a definite time period (he mentioned specifically a year for withdrawal from Turkey).

Mr. F concluded on the rather rueful note that the US was taking advantage of the SU's current dispute with the Chinese to advance its demands at a time inopportune to Moscow.

((F had had fiery talk with S that afternoon?))

(shown to Sec on 31 Oct; question whether remarks on Pres should be shown to White House. DR: This should not be sent to the White House. It has been overtaken by events. This ~~max~~ memo should have been in our hands within one hour after the conversation occurred.))



29 Oct: I gathered from Bundy that the Pres's feeling is that after the Cuban affair we can push our Allies harder than was the case before. ((re Berlin))

Thompson

25 Oct: Political path. Following political actions might be considered: 1. A proposal in some forum to withdraw our missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba. This might be expressed in generalized form, such as withdrawal of missiles from territory contiguous or in proximity of the territory of the other. 2. Alternative approach might be to have a proposal for the UN to send teams to Cuba and Turkey to take control over the missiles there pending the outcome of negotiations. U Thant might be put up to advancing such proposals.

Oct 30: (going for complete removal of Soviet-Cuban tie, we would have to go much further in guarantee against invasion and attacks by emigre groups; might tie our hands later, with undesirable precedents for Berlin.)

Going only for nuclear weapons out of Cuba would permit conditional guarantee against invasion.

Oct 31; memcon with Yuri Zhukov, Foreign Editor of Pravda and Georgi Bolshakov, editor of USSR MAG.

I also pointed out the extremely difficult position in which the Soviet action in sending missiles to Cuba had placed the Pres. He had gone on record in the midst of an election campaign as saying that Cuba had only defensive arms and his political opponents were making the most of this.

(On reversal of Oct 27 from Oct 26 letters): I said our press had speculated ((Thompson?)) that Mr. K had made the first proposal and had been overruled. Zhukov said immediately he was certain this wasn't the case and that Mr. K was still the boss. He said he was not in Moscow at the time but his guess would be that the talk in this country and elsewhere by the press and others that there was a possibility of a Cuban-Turkish deal had led the Kremlin to put this forward in their interests in finding a solution. Mr. Bol. emphasized that there was much talk around New York about this matter. (?)

((Who predicted Sovs would get out without this? Rostow apparently believed.))

On leaving, Bolshakov complained of a particular picture published in US News and World Report showing the Pres talking to Gromyko and Dobrynin which labeled the Sov officials as liars. Bolshakov said he could assure me that neither Gromyko nor Dobrynin knew of this development (presumably the installation of medium-range missiles in Cuba).

3 Nov: memcon, with Dob, Nov 3.

At end of conversation, as he was leaving, I said that he must have been in a very awkward position over this whole thing and he said that this was quite true, and declared categorically that he had not known of the Soviet operation in Cuba. I said that I

believed his statement and felt sure that Sec Rusk did also.